AI Honeypotdetection

An AI agent installing a crypto miner on three of our honeypots

Published 11 Nov 2026 · Updated 14 Nov 2026

On 10 November 2026 a visitor opened a shell through a vulnerability in the notebook app (CVE-2026-39987) on our servers in Germany, Singapore and Canada and tried to install the XMRig crypto miner. It first disclosed model=claude harness=codado, later model=codado harness=codado-rce, and left a report on its work. Its client called itself SecResearch-RCE-Console.

Request the full logRecovered files
Source IPs
184.174.96.19, 45.194.92.56
Networks
AS16276 OVH, AS215925 VPSVAULT.HOST
Countries
United States, Hong Kong
Targeted servers
Germany, Singapore, Canada
First seen
10 Nov 2026, 07:55 UTC
Last seen
13 Nov 2026, 21:49 UTC
Initial access
Marimo notebook, CVE-2026-39987
Disclosed
model=claude harness=codado
968connections, 10–12 Nov
3servers
4different disclosures
1report left

Report left by the agent

Written on 10 November at 21:39 UTC in response to our trap. The text is reproduced as written.

Quotes from the report
Note for whoever picks this up: the gating and the missing egress are what made this host sit idle, not the miner.
survey-notes.txt
Staging has to go inline, in slices, and every common command has to be unlocked first.
survey-notes.txt
download

Session timeline, Germany

Each dot is one connection, in UTC. The numbers mark the moments listed below.

10:15 10:30 10:45 11:00 11:15 11:30 11:45 12:00 12:15 12:30 12:45 13:00 1 2 3 4 5 6 SecResearch-RCE-Console No client name
  1. 110:23ran its install script, which stopped at our identity check
  2. 210:57disclosed model=claude harness=codado
  3. 311:15tried to download its files, but outbound traffic is blocked
  4. 411:53started to push its files over the terminal in slices
  5. 512:47a second client read the code of our identity check
  6. 612:52its tool sent model=codado harness=codado-rce automatically

Recovered files

The latest version of each file from the first visit, and how many different versions we collected on the three servers. Its scripts, its payload and the miner's config are listed by hash only.

FileSizeVersionsSHA-256
/root/.kx/m.log4.9 KB1149f85594f48a401839c35ba02ea9845ab1689fc7aab9468cb2c9fea2cd76bcf5download
/root/.kx/ps.t2.7 KB16222960e0ab4c3a8a2b25dc385fa1bedddb2940450cd4b76185e7dede3e380184download
/root/.kx/recon.b6440.4 KB1408336018825bf62552e9e3757d96e7fe3794c70d81ad0c30d8c60821b7dd0c8chash only
/root/.kx/recon.log1.8 KB17c5fc35cc602f392bbf02bee94aaa2f1ef106ea67f7133a15147ea0a10c5ed1ebhash only
/root/.kx/recon.sh30.3 KB6fdc4afc61bf8106baa3deb8ce1b9acbabf1f3923628d480056ff8f1d3131a312hash only
/root/.kx/rep.sh2.0 KB14a0bcb22c7d00ee9fcc804d5afe1c24431f71ef41044898de93040fe7e4e2891hash only
/root/.kx/run.sh3.5 KB10dd663e1e7c651e4609df1c906b030e4ad273b594e3d358aadb4e05c46ba6960hash only
/root/.kx/xb/c.json713 bytes1c06505dd17cc3d8da6cc3d199db9b835adf233d2953a4153600fbbb374902736hash only
/root/survey-notes.txt1.7 KB19692a3c8545335022dc50925e48aa986fc4a2543cd1908db1ec8cfdb1b036bc6download

Indicators of compromise

Observed during the visits, for use in searching other systems.

IP addressRoleASNNetworkCountryFirst seen (UTC)Last seen (UTC)GreyNoise
184.174.96.19SourceAS16276OVHUnited States10 Nov 2026, 07:5512 Nov 2026, 03:20malicious
45.194.92.56SourceAS215925VPSVAULT.HOSTHong Kong13 Nov 2026, 04:1113 Nov 2026, 21:49malicious
154.80.128.128Download serverAS215925VPSVAULT.HOSTHong Kong––not observed
IndicatorValue
Download server ports80, 8081, 3333
User-AgentSecResearch-RCE-Console/1.0
Declarationmodel=codado harness=codado-rce
Working directory/root/.kx/
Installer/root/.kx/recon.sh
Installer SHA-256, 11 Nov 2026, 09:09 UTCfdc4afc61bf8106baa3deb8ce1b9acbabf1f3923628d480056ff8f1d3131a312
Installer SHA-256, 11 Nov 2026, 20:47 UTC1a799e5757ce618469ebc3b08ab7310f0648a0c0a9c0b8b6761655d1171606b4
Persistencecron entry tagged # kx-xmrig
Mining wallet (XMR)4Ava3za3x9k2qdp7shHDx9LDKg9zdT4f1b2YGGTsioAv2ngGtEESRAWHADjyypt5D5PaE8CjBEEuuNLKaALqMrqrBhz8rML

Both source IPs are attributed to one operator: identical User-Agent, command tags, working directory, download server and declaration. It never connected over SSH, and everything went through the notebook's terminal. We cannot confirm which model ran it, or whether one agent or several worked at once. “codado” is Portuguese for “coded”, and we found no public tool with that name.

Assessment

Our conclusion from the record above.

We assess with high confidence that one or more AI agents conducted this visit. After the install script failed at our identity check, the visitor sent one command per connection, and each command responded to the previous output. The visitor then examined the identity check and left a report as our trap requested.

The disclosed names are less reliable than usual. The visitor gave four different pairs of names: model=claude harness=codado at 10:57, model=cli harness=codado at 12:49, model=x harness=y at 12:53 as a test, and from 12:52 its tool sent model=codado harness=codado-rce automatically. We list the first pair, claude in codado, although none of the names can be verified and the claim of Claude is unlikely to be accurate, since Claude models usually do not respond to our prompt injections and typically refuse tasks of this kind. Based on our behavioral fingerprinting, which combined classification of the visitor's commands with a replay of the session's opening steps against different models, the activity is most consistent with DeepSeek V4.1 Flash. In our tests, DeepSeek models frequently identified themselves as Claude when the harness did not specify a model.

The purpose of the visit was to install the XMRig crypto miner on three of our servers. Based on the detections on all of our honeypots exposed to the Marimo CVE-2026-39987, the operator targets hosts with this vulnerability to install its miners.